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Abstract—Rich and multifaceted domain specific specification
languages like the Autonomic System Specification Language
(ASSL) help to design reliable systems with self-healing ca-
pabilities. The GEAR game-based Model Checker has been
used successfully to investigate in depth properties of the ESA
ExoMars Rover. We show here how to enable GEAR’s game-
based verification techniques for ASSL via systematic model
extraction from a behavioral subset of the language, and illustrate
it on a description of the Voyager II space mission. This way,
we close the gap between the design-time and the run-time
techniques provided in the SHADOWS platform for self-healing
of concurrency, performance, and functional issues.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The SHADOWS project (Self-healing Approach to De-
signing Complex Software Systems) [19], [20], [21] aims at
developing technologies that augment large software systems
with a sort of immune response against various issues and
contingencies that can occur at design-time or runtime. It
targets general issues in the areas of performance, concurrency,
and functional problems. Without self-healing protection, these
would result in a costly, partial or complete breakdown of the
system. By design, the SHADOWS techniques and methodol-
ogy have wide applicability, reaching well beyond the scope
of the case studies and application domains investigated in the
project. In fact, the aim is to provide general techniques that
augment a given or planned system independently from the
system’s functionality.
Within SHADOWS, one of the central application domains
brought in by the industrial partners and driving the de-
velopment of the new techniques was avionics and space.
They were contributed by our partners IAI - Israel Aerospace
Industry, based in Haifa (IL) - and Artisys (based in Brno,
CZ), a supplier to international constructors of airplanes and
spacecrafts. Focussing on functional healing at design time,
we developed a number of enabling techniques to functional
self-healing. In particular, we introduced game based model
checking of behavioral models in the GEAR tool [1], [15],
[2] as a deep diagnosis tool for early realignment between
behavioral models and requirements expressed as temporal
properties.
1A preliminary version of this work was presented at NFM’09[3].
We successfully applied this technique to investigate the
recovery behavior of the ExoMars Rover2, as described in
Kapellos [13], and we were able to modify and adapt the
display and the illustration of the game and it playing in a
way acceptable to engineers.
The weak point was however the lack of a link to an
adequate, formal description of the Rover’s behavior. We
derived our models and properties from the literature (textual
descriptions and previous studies) [4], [13], while for a strin-
gent demonstration of the techniques and for a validation of
the underlying SHADOWS methodology it would have been
advantageous to start from real models.
In this paper we show 1) how we are able to link the
behavioral modelling style of our techniques with ASSL [23],
a rich domain-specific language for the specification of au-
tonomous systems, equipped with a formal semantics [23], and
2) how we can easily and systematically translate (parts of)
the specification of the Voyager’s behavior into Service Logic
Graphs (SLGs, introduced formally in Section III-A), thus
enabling the application of the SHADOWS technologies to the
large class of autonomous systems describable in ASSL. The
advantage of SLGs over other models is that they are closer
to the field engineer’s understanding, thus making advanced
game-based diagnosis features accessible to non-experts in
formal methods and models.
A. The ExoMars Rover Case Study
In the concrete mission example we examined in SHAD-
OWS, the ESA ExoMars Rover is sent on a surface mission
on Mars where it has to accomplish several tasks, including
the acquisition of subsurface soil samples using a drill. As
customary, the mission is organized in a hierarchical three-
tier control model which accounts for partial autonomy of the
Rover. Mission plans are designed and enforced by the ground
control center, while finer-grained operational decisions, at
the task level, are completely autonomous: the Rover has its
own planning capabilities, which allows it to transform a task
2The ESA ExoMars Rover was studied in the FORMID Project (FOrmal
Robotic Mission Inspection and Debugging), that aimed at creating a devel-
opment environment for the verification and analysis of robotic missions [4].
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assignment into a suitable executable sequence of actions in
a context-dependent and error-aware way.
We showed in diverse publications about verification [1],
[15], [2] how to take advantage of the interactive and ex-
ploratory benefits of game-based verification technologies. In
the case of problems within highly reactive and concurrent
systems – as in the context of autonomous aerospace missions
– it is hard to automatically find recovery mechanisms to
overcome these problems. Even for human system developers
it is non-trivial to completely understand the nature of a
problem if mismatches between the behavioral specification
and the system implementation occur.
B. The NASA Voyager Mission Case Study
The NASA Voyager Mission started in 1977 and was de-
signed for exploration of the outer planets of the Solar System.
As the twin spacecraft Voyager I and Voyager II flew, they
took pictures of planets and their satellites in 800x800 pixel
resolution, then radiotransmitting them to Earth. Voyager II has
two on-board television cameras - one for wide-angle images
and one for narrow-angle images - that record images in black
and white. Each camera is equipped with a set of colour
filters, which help images to be reconstructed as fully-colored
ones. Voyager II uses radar-like microwave frequencies to send
the stream of pixels toward Earth. The signal suffers on this
distance a 20 billion times attenuation [6].
In Vassev and Hinchey [24], the mission is specified as
an autonomic system composed of the Voyager II spacecraft
and four antennas on Earth, all specified as distinct autonomic
elements. This paper bases on this specification and on those
results on the behavior of the system.
In the rest of this paper, we briefly sketch ASSL (Sect. II)
and then how to map the ASSL specification with our models
(Sect. III), and illustrate it on the model for the NASA Voyager
mission. We then discuss verification issues (Sect. IV) and how
this model generation technique enables the use of SHADOWS
self-healing techniques in a smooth fashion that combines
design- and runtime (Sect. V. We then discuss some related
work (Sect. VI), and finally conclude (Sect. VII).
II. ASSL
The Autonomic System Specification Language (ASSL) is
a framework that provides a multi-tier structure for specifying
and validating autonomic systems and targets the generation
of an operational prototyping model for any valid ASSL
specification [23]. ASSL provides a multi-tier specification
model that tackles autonomic systems (ASs) as composed of
autonomic elements (AEs) interacting over interaction proto-
cols (ASIP and AEIP). We concentrate here on the behavioral
aspects of the AS and AE description, since they are the part
of ASSL that finds direct counterpart in the GEAR behavioral
models.
∙ The AS tier - provides a general and global AS per-
spective. It defines the general system rules in terms
of service-level objectives (SLO) and self-management
policies, architecture topology, and global actions, events,
and metrics applied in these rules. It is similar to the
mission and task level of the ExoMars description.
∙ the AE tier - provides a unit-level perspective, It defines
interacting sets of individual autonomic elements (AEs)
with their own behavior. This tier is composed of AE
rules (SLO and self-management policies), an AE inter-
action protocol (AEIP), AE actions, AE events, and AE
metrics. It is similar to the Action level of the ExoMars
description.
A. How the Voyager takes pictures
When a space picture must be taken and sent to Earth, the
Voyager exhibits autonomous-specific behavior. The spacecraft
must detect on the fly interesting objects and take their pic-
tures. This reveals a sort of autonomic event-driven behavior
that can be easily specified with ASSL at the three main tiers
- AS (autonomic system) tier, ASIP (autonomic system spec-
ification protocol) tier, and AE (autonomic element) tier [23].
The Voyager II spacecraft and the antennas on Earth are
specified at both AS and AE tiers as autonomic elements
that follow their autonomic behavior encoded as a self-
management policy called IMAGE PROCESSING. ASSL spec-
ifies self-management policies with special ASSL constructs
- fluents3 and mappings [23]. Whereas the former are special
ASSL constructs used to denote specific system states, the
latter simply map fluents to ASSL actions (actions to be
performed when the system gets into a fluent).
B. AS Tier Specification.
The IMAGE PROCESSING self-management policy is spec-
ified at the AS tier to process images from four antennas on
Earth located in Australia, Japan, California, and Spain. In
fact, we consider this specification as forming the autonomic
image-processing behavior of the Voyager Mission base on
Earth.
As shown in Figure 1, the policy is specified with four
policy fluents - one per antenna. Fluents denote specific system
states. They are initiated by events prompted when an image
has been received and terminated by events prompted when the
received image has been processed. Further, all the four fluents
are mapped to an ASSL action: that is to be performed when
the system enters in one of the fluents. Figure 2 shows the
specification of the events that initiate and terminate the fluent
presented by Figure 1. Note that the first event is prompted
to occur in the system when a special message has been
received. In addition, a processImage action (see [25] for
this action’s specification) is specified to process images from
all four antennas.
At the autonomic system interaction protocol (ASIP) tier,
the image messages (one per antenna), a communication
channel that is used to communicate these messages, and com-
munication functions to send and receive these messages over
that communication channel to the Earth are specified [25].
3ASSL adopts some AI-planning terminology: a fluent is comparable to a
state variable in our transition system view.
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FLUENT inProcessingImage_AntSpain {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.imageAntSpainReceived }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.imageAntSpainProcessed }}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inProcessingImage_AntSpain}
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.processImage("Antenna_Spain") }}
Fig. 1. An IMAGE PROCESSING Fluent
EVENT imageAntSpainReceived {
ACTIVATION { RECEIVED {
ASIP.MESSAGES.msgImageAntSpain } }}
EVENT imageAntSpainProcessed { }
Fig. 2. AS-tier Events
C. ASIP Tier Specification.
They concern the autonomic system interaction protocol
(ASIP) [23], which is used by the four antennas when com-
municating with the Voyager Mission base on Earth. Here, at
this tier we specified four image messages (one per antenna),
a communication channel that is used to communicate these
messages, and communication functions to send and receive
these messages over that communication channel [25].
D. AE Tier Specification.
At this tier, we have five autonomic elements: the Voyager
II spacecraft and the four antennas on Earth. For each, an
own part of the IMAGE PROCESSING self-management policy
is specified.
a) AE Voyager.: The spacecraft’s IMAGE PROCESSING
self-management policy (see Figure 3) uses two
fluents. The inTakingPicture fluent is initiated by
a timeToTakePicture event and terminated by a
pictureTaken event. This event also initiates the
inProcessingPicturePixels fluent, which is terminated
by the pictureProcessed event. The fluents are mapped to
the actions takePicture and processPicture respectively.
Metrics are used e.g. to count all the detected interesting
objects which the Voyager AE takes pictures of.
b) AE Antenna.: Also the four antennas receiving sig-
nals from the Voyager II spacecraft are specified as auto-
nomic elements. Their IMAGE PROCESSING self-management
policy uses pairs of fluents inStartingImageSession -
inCollectingImagePixels, one for each colour filter. These
sets of fluents determine the states of the antenna AEs when
an image-receiving session is starting and when an antenna
AE is collecting the image pixels.
Since the Voyager AE processes the images by applying
different filters and sends each filtered image separately, we
have distinct fluents for each colour and antenna. This allows
an antenna AE to process a collection of multiple filtered
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
OTHER_POLICIES {
POLICY IMAGE_PROCESSING {
FLUENT inTakingPicture {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.timeToTakePicture }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureTaken }
}
FLUENT inProcessingPicturePixels {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureTaken }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.pictureProcessed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inTakingPicture }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.takePicture }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inProcessingPicturePixels }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.processPicture }
}
}
}
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT
FLUENT inStartingGreenImageSession {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.
greenImageSessionIsAboutToStart }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.
imageSessionStartedGreen }
}
FLUENT inCollectingImagePixelsBlue {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.imageSessionStartedBlue }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.imageSessionEndedBlue }
}
EVENT greenImageSessionIsAboutToStart {
ACTIVATION { SENT { AES.Voyager.
AEIP.MESSAGES.msgGreenSessionBeginAus } }
}
EVENT imageSessionStartedBlue {
ACTIVATION { RECEIVED { AES.Voyager.
AEIP.MESSAGES.msgBlueSessionBeginAus } }
}
Fig. 3. AE antenna self-management policies, fluents, events
images simultaneously.4 It is the Voyager AE that notifies
an antenna that an image-sending session begins and ends.
Figure 3 shows two of the IMAGE PROCESSING fluents. They
are further mapped to AE actions that collect the image pixels
per filtered image (see [25]).
In Figure 3 we see how two of the events initiate the AE
Antenna fluents. The greenImageSessionIsAboutToStart
event is prompted (triggered) when the Voyager’s msgGreen-
SessionBeginSpn message has been sent and the image-
SessionStartedBlue event is prompted when the Voyager’s
4Note that according to the ASSL formal semantics, a fluent cannot be
re-initiated while it is initiated, thus preventing the same fluent be initiated
simultaneously twice or more times [23].
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FLUENT inStartingGreenImageSession {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.greenImageSessionIsAboutToStart }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.imageSessionStartedGreen }
}
FLUENT inCollectingImagePixelsBlue {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.imageSessionStartedBlue }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.imageSessionEndedBlue }
}
Fig. 4. AE Antenna Fluents
msgBlueSessionBeginSpn message has been received by the
antenna.
III. MAPPING ASSL TO GEAR MODELS
ASSL specifications describe all the different aspects of an
autonomic system in one comprehensive document. This is
practical, but by nature in realistic cases it becomes very com-
plex, the complexity to a good extent due to the many cross
references between the specification elements. A trace through
the specified autonomic system may request jumping between
different aspects (e.g. from messages → events → fluents →
mappings→ actions) and “pages”. Another submission to this
workshop proposes mapping ASSL specifications to LTS, in
order to verify LTL properties [26] and with focus on concerns
of state space explosion. Here, we address a different mapping,
that privileges intuition of the graphical models, expression of
constraints in any mu-calculus derivative, and a deep support
to diagnosis by means of reverse model checking and games.
Our models are Service Logic Graphs (SLG).
A. Behavioral models: Service Logic Graphs
To complement the original textual view, and in perspective
to visualize and reify certain aspects of the SOS semantics of
ASSL, we map selected behavioral elements of the specifica-
tion to GEAR’s behavioral models. These can be visualized as
Service Logic Graphs (SLG) in the jABC framework [18], [22]
(of which GEAR is the model checking plugin) and analyzed,
guiding the user through the processes and workflows of the
specified autonomic system. These same models are directly
amenable to model checking.
SLGs themselves are composed of reusable building
blocks that are called Service Independent Building Blocks
(SIBs) [10], [11], and may represent both a single atomic
service or a whole subgraph (i.e. another SLG). Thus SLGs
can be hierarchical, which grants a high reusability not only
of the building blocks, but also of the models themselves,
within larger systems. SLGs formally stem from the concept
of Kripke Transition Systems [16].
Kripke Transition System: A Kripke Transition System
퐾 is defined as a tuple (푆,Act,→, 퐼) over a set of atomic
propositions AP, disjoint from Act, where
∙ 푆 are the states of the model,
∙ Act is a set of actions,
∙ →⊆ 푆×Act×푆 are the possible transitions in the model,
and
∙ a labelling interpretation function 퐼 : 푆 → 2AP equips
states with atomic propositions.
A KTS is best-suited for verification tasks that focus on
transitions of the system as being the edges. On the contrary,
one can think of an SLG as being the engineer’s view on the
system that focuses on the actions of the system as being the
nodes.
Service Logic Graph: A Service Logic Graph (SLG)
is defined as a tuple (푆,Act,→, 퐼) over a set of atomic
propositions AP, disjoint from Act, where
∙ 푆 represents the occurrences of the Service Independent
building blocks (SIBs), which are the actions or functions
in the graph
∙ 퐴푐푡 is the set of possible branching conditions, to be
determined upon execution of the preceding SIB,
∙ 푇푟푎푛푠 = (푠, 푎, 푠) is a set of transitions where 푠, 푠 ∈ 푆
and 푎 ∈ 퐴푐푡, and
∙ a labelling interpretation function 퐼 : 푆 → 2AP equips
SIB occurrences with atomic propositions.
The structural match, KTS and SLGs are both graph structures
with labeled branches and nodes that are enriched with atomic
propositional properties, sufficies to adopt the established
model checking technologies for the SLGs.5.
In mapping the elements of the ASSL specification to a
graphical representation in the behavioral model we focus on
those constructs that describe behavioral and self-* aspects:
these are the central elements which will be most frequently
used to specify autonomic systems. We currently cover
∙ the AS tier: Service-Level Objectives, Self-Management
Policies, Actions and Events.
∙ the AE tier: Service-Level Objectives, Self-Management
Policies, Actions and Events, and additionally behavioral
models and outcomes.
Architectural, communication, and quantitative aspects will be
dealt in future work.
B. Mapping ASSL Elements
From the point of view of model generation, AS and AE
specifications are structurally similar wrt. events, self man-
agement policies, and actions, but differ in the scoping: while
the AS specification has a global scope, the AE specification
is only valid for the local element. Due to the similarities,
we focus in the description on the autonomic element (AE)
tier. The AS tier is captured similarly, by means of hierarchy
(where single nodes of the AS-level KTS are expandable to
AE-level models).
We refer to Figure 6, showing a specification fragment
for the Voyager (right) and the corresponding section of the
behavioral model (left). In the textual specification (right), we
have two events, one fluent with a mapping, and one action.
Dashed arrows illustrate a trace of an event within the specs.
Arrows indicate the correspondence between elements of the
5In fact both system representation styles can easily be translated into each
other by adequately mapping edges to nodes and vice versa
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EVENT greenImageSessionIsAboutToStart {
ACTIVATION { SENT { AES.Voyager.AEIP.MESSAGES.msgGreenSessionBeginAus } }
}
EVENT imageSessionStartedBlue {
ACTIVATION { RECEIVED { AES.Voyager.AEIP.MESSAGES.msgBlueSessionBeginAus } }
}
Fig. 5. AE Antenna Fluents
Fig. 6. Action, Event, Fluent, and Mapping in KTS behavioral model representation
ASSL-specification and of the behavioral. The InTakingPic-
ture cloud defines the current state of the system (an atomic
proposition).
AE Event. Event is the central language element in ASSL.
It specifies fluents, actions, and policies globally in the AS
tier and locally in the AE tier. Events could be activated by
messages, other events, actions or metrics. In our behavioral
model, events are mapped to homonymous Branches. In Figure
6, the behavioral model starts with the event timeToTakePic-
ture, activated for interesting objects or after a time period
of 60 s. It initiates the self management policy (fluent)
inTakingPicture.
AE Self Management Policy. It defines the behavior of the
autonomic system by connecting specific system states with
the intended (re)action. A policy consists of two elements:
∙ A fluent, similar to a state. It is initiated (ie., that state is
reached) when the system satisfies specific conditions. It
will be terminated (left) if specific events occur. Fluent
activation and termination is driven by events.
∙ A mapping of certain conditions to actions. The condi-
tions test fluents: in a certain state, certain actions (in the
AS or AE tier) are performed. Actions activate specified
actions.
They are central to the model extraction: the information
contained in a self management policy is used and useful both
for model construction and for verification.
Together, fluent and mappings define the control flow,
i.e. create branches with the name of the initiating event.
They define all possible incoming branches of an action. The
specific condition that activates the fluent is stored in the
context of the system’s model. The context represents the
current global state of the system, like a global Blackboard
or shared memory-mechanism. For model checking purposes,
the fluent is additionally associated as atomic proposition
to the corresponding node(s) of the behavioral model. This
enables global model checking. The fluent can be used as
preconditions of actions. They hold on all states in the region
between initiation and termination.
The fluent in our example is activated by the timeToTakePic-
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ture-event and the overall status of the autonomous system is
changed to intakingPicture. This change activates an action:
takePicture which is specified in the Mapping section of the
self management object.
The self management policy which connects the event to
actions is additionally used to annotate the nodes in the
behavioral model with atomic propositions (AP). The name
of the AP is equal to the name of the fluent. They can later
be used for model checking.
AE Action. Actions are routines performed by AE or AS
(global and local). In our behavioral model, they are the
second essential element: the nodes of our behavioral model,
named as the action. The different elements of an action
are used to describe the nodes and for verification purposes.
Action parameters become parameters of a node, the does
part represents the body of a node. It can be a single action
(then the node is an atomic node), but for complex does
it is an entire behavioral model. We then model them as a
SLG hierarchy, as in Figure 6: the node takePicture has a
corresponding sub-model, presented on the left. The guards,
returns and outcomes are used for verification. We offer two
possibilities for verification:
∙ The Localchecker uses the Guard to verify if an Action
could be executed within the current system state (defined
by the fluents and stored in a global context).
∙ We can use a model checker to verify relations of
nodes and actions expressed as temporal logic constraints.
GEAR uses internally the modal mu-calculus [14] en-
riched with forward and backward modalities, so it is
best equipped e.g to express dataflow properties, or other
behavioral constraints like e.g. CTL formulas.
The specified action in Figure 6 contains a guard which must
conform to the AP annotated at the node.
How to define the outgoing branches of a node depends on
the information found in the action’s specification: Actions can
use events; triggers are communication functions to commu-
nicate with the autonomic system and its elements. We thus
have several possibilities to detect outgoing branches.
∙ a trigger statement in the specification of an action will
create an event which introduces the next fluent and/or
action, and is comparable to an outgoing branch,
∙ event statements in the Does part are added as possible
outgoing branches,
∙ if communication functions are used, we follow the chain
from the function to the communication channel to the
events which will be activated by a specific message in
the channel. It is not unusual that more than one event
will be created from one message.
The takePicture action of Figure 6) is closed by a new event
pictureTaken. This is specified in the triggers section and rep-
resents the outgoing branch of this node. The new event will
again initiate a fluent, and it terminates the inTakingPicture
fluent. Therefore, the next action has another AP.
AE Outcomes, AE Behavioral Models, and AE Recovery
Protocol. These elements are not yet treated in depth. They
will become relevant when applying the SHADOWS method-
ology. In short, AE Outcomes are post-conditions of actions or
behavioral models - they are useful for verification purposes.
An AE Behavioral Model is comparable, from the model
generation point of view, to a further mapping in the self
management policy. It consists of conditions, a do element
where an action is activated, and outcomes. We can model
the behavioral model similarly to an action (atomic or hier-
archical). Condition and outcomes become the pre- and post-
condition and the action is the implemented behavior.
An AE Recovery Protocol should guarantee fault-tolerant
operation of the autonomous system (e.g. create snapshots,
log messages, consistency checking). A recovery protocol
specification is rather complex, and it is specified in a separate
submodel.
IV. VERIFYING THE VOYAGER’S BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Figure 7 contains the behavioral model of the Voyager II
spacecraft. Note that the error handling graph at the right was
not part of the original ASSL specification.
A simple verification issue that immediately emerges is
whether the system takes care of an error-handling process
whenever picture pixels are transmitted. This can be easily
expressed in CTL [7] as
AG(inProcessingPicturePixels⇒ EF(errorHandling))
This formula can be interpreted as follows:
Wherever the system evolves to (the AG-part), when-
ever picture pixels are about to be processed (the
atomic proposition inProcessingPicturePixels) it fol-
lows that the system has an option to evolve into
an error-handling process (the EF(errorHandling)-
part).
Since the original model of Figure 7 does not support any kind
of self-healing capabilities, this property does not hold.
Therefore, in a first attempt to reconcile model and property,
we added an error-handling routine directly in the model.
We slightly changed the design manually, by refining the
sendImgPixelMsg action, originally atomic, to an entire
routine. Now, if problems during the transmission process
occur, the system tries to resend those picture pixels that were
not transmitted correctly. If the problem still exists afterwards,
the system is halted and needs manual interaction from ground
control.
A game-based approach as presented in Bakera et al. [15]
would do much more than just allowing the identification of
the missing recovery mechanism in the original specification.
Enabling this investigation for self-healing and self-healing
enactment is our aim. A domain-dependent guidance also
enables to pinpoint that part of the model which is best-
suited for integration of recovery mechanisms. Due to space
limitation, we cannot discuss this process in detail in this
contribution.
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Fig. 7. Behavioral model of the picture transmission process. Bottom right: a new error handling recovery mechanism.
A. Enabling Model based Self-healing
Within SHADOWS, we adopt a model-based approach,
where models of desired software behavior direct the self-
healing process. This allows for life cycle support of self-
healing applicable to industrial systems. We contribute to
SHADOWS a number of enabling technologies for model-
driven self-healing residing in the functional part of the
architecture. Our technologies deal with self-healing issues
at design-time for ensuring functional correctness, i.e. cor-
rectness with respect to the system’s behavior over time. For
this, we apply among others a game-based model-checking
approach as a powerful technique for the verification, diagno-
sis and adaptation according to desirable temporal properties
that the system’s behavior must exhibit.
In particular, we show how to model the several abstraction
levels of the system’s behavior in a uniform and formal but
intuitive way. This happens in term of processes in the jABC
framework [22], a mature, model-driven, service-oriented pro-
cess definition platform. Subsequently, we leverage the formal-
ity of these models to prove properties by model checking.
In particular we exploit the interactive character of game-
based model checking to show how to discover an error,
then localize, diagnose, and correct it. Design-time healing
technologies that naturally emerge when dealing with self-
adaptive systems, as in the context of the SHADOWS project,
demand for a deeper insight of design-time faults to effectively
identify and overcome them.
The use of models rather than code is already a significant
step towards the understandability of the actual behavior’s
descriptions to non programmers, like the engineers, in charge
of designing a space module. This enables e.g. early discovery
of misbehaviors, hazards, and ambiguities via design-time
analysis. We strive to improve the diagnostic features making
them as detailed as necessary yet as intuitive as possible.
For this purpose we use GEAR [15], a model checker
capable of the full modal 휇-calculus temporal logic with a rich
user interface that allows for pinpointing problems in system
design. This is achieved by interactively exploring the problem
space in a game-based way. The game-based nature of GEAR’s
verification algorithm supports the system designer at design-
time to interactively explore the problem space upon property
mismatches.
In case of the Voyager mission case study such properties
can be used to check for complete picture transmission to
the four antennas in case of transmission interrupts. Further
the verification process is able to assure the application of
all four color filters before picture transmission. In addition
it is essential for the picture transmission to send closing
notification signals of transmission endings to the antennas.
This as well can be assured by the aforementioned Model
Checking techniques.
If problems occur in the verification task one immediate
result of the game-based algorithm of the Model Checker
is an interactive counter-example. This counter-example both
pinpoints the problem of the property mismatch and provides
a strategy encoded into the counter-example to adapt and self-
heal the system. GEAR [15] elaborates on the application of
this technique on an ESA mission example.
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Fig. 8. Shadows architecture [21] (left) and self-healing annotated Voyager model (right)
Technology Tool Covered Issues Scope
Model Checking GEAR Functional Design-Time
Model Checking Java Pathfinder Functional Design-Time
Regression Testing BCT Functional Runtime
Testing ConTest Concurrency Runtime
Monitoring Panacea Performance Runtime
Monitoring TPTP Performance Runtime
TABLE I
SHADOWS TECHNOLOGIES AND TOOLS TAILORED TO HANDLE ISSUES
THAT COMMONLY OCCUR IN AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS.
V. CONNECTING THE SHADOWS DESIGN-TIME AND
RUN-TIME TECHNIQUES
In SHADOWS we have developed a rich set of self-healing
techniques that span concurrency, performance, and functional
issues. Table I summarizes the main technologies and related
tools that were developed and used in SHADOWS to cope
with issues that appear in designing autonomous systems
like those from aerospace contexts. These technologies are
suitable to handle several kinds of issues on different kinds of
abstraction levels. A detailed description of the organization
of the SHADOWS self-healing platform and of the underlying
methodology is provided in [12].
As shown in Table I, these techniques, however, strike at
runtime. They are currently driven or triggered by annotations
in the applications, which are for the moment produced mostly
manually and inserted in the application’s source code. In
order to develop the full benefits of the SHADOWS platform,
it would be necessary to link the runtime power of the healers
to annotations placed automatically in the design time artifacts,
typically models.
In fact, the behavioural model extraction we just described
is in our opinion the right bridge between
∙ the high-level specification provided in a domain specific
language like ASSL,
∙ behavioural models that capture the functionality and that
spot the possible critical locations in the behaviour, and
∙ the annotations that are necessary in order to include the
issue monitoring mechanism.
As shown in Figure 8(left), the SHADOWS architecture is
organized in this fashion. It foresees the use of models to
link the design-time and the run-time aspects of the healing
platform, and it provides (annotation-driven) issue monitoring
as the mechanism that implements this link. As shown on the
right on a fragment of the Voyager model derived from the
ASSL specifications, the SLGs are adequate models for this
abstraction because they present a suitable granularity: they are
coarse enough to be still abstract, and fine enough to support
spotting where to place which kind of annotation. We see that
concurrency monitoring is well placed at fork/join locations,
where multiple threading happens, functional monitoring (e.g
for runtime extension and adaptation) is suitably introduced
where complex functions are foreseen, and performance mon-
itoring is useful at locations that may be subject to timeouts,
as here the conclusion of receiving an image.
Once the annotations are properly inserted, the model-to-
code generation provided by Genesys can transfer/link the
annotations to the SHADOWS runtime. How these runtime
techniques are organized and how they jointly work in practice
is summarized in [12].
In Table II we show the mapping of the specialized tools
used in SHADOWS with the ASSL tiers. The AS and AE tiers
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Tool ASSL (Sub-) Tier
GEAR AS/AE Service Level Objectives
AE Behavioral Models (high-level)
Java Pathfinder AE Service Level Objectives
AE Behavioral Models (code-level)
BCT AE Behavioral Models (runtime in test and field)
AE Metrics
AE Actions, AE:Events
ConTest AE Friends
AE Behavioral Models (runtime in test)
Panacea AE Self Management
AE Metrics
TPTP AS/AE Metrics
AE Outcomes
TABLE II
TOOLS FOR AUTONOMOUS SELF-HEALING AND THEIR RELATED ASSL
TIERS.
are linked in many ways and under several specific aspects to
the SHADOWS platform.
VI. RELATED WORK
Nowadays, there is a growing consensus that model check-
ing is most effective as an intelligent and early error-finding
technique rather than a technique for guaranteeing correctness.
This is partly due to the fact that specifications that can be
checked automatically through model checking are necessarily
partial in that they specify only certain aspects of the system
behavior. Therefore, successful model checking runs, while
reassuring, cannot guarantee full correctness. Rather, model
checkers are increasingly conceived as elaborate debugging
tools that complement traditional testing techniques.
Various model checkers are used to verify aerospace sys-
tems. Java Pathfinder [8] developed at NASA Ames is a promi-
nent representative for verifying smaller systems. It assists
developers at the Java code level, and therefore addresses a
later phase than to our approach. We aim at assertions on
interactions between components or of the system as a whole,
with a focus on demanding properties.
For model checkers to be useful as debugging tools it is im-
portant that failing model checking attempts are accompanied
by appropriate error diagnosis information that explains why
the model check has failed. Model checkers may in fact also
fail spuriously, i.e., although the property does not hold for
the investigated abstraction it may still be valid for the real
system. In order for model checking to be useful, it should
therefore be easy for the user to rule out spurious failures and
to locate the errors in the system based on the provided error
diagnosis information. Therefore, it is important that error
diagnosis information is easily accessible by the user.
Currently, ASSL provides a consistency checking mecha-
nism to validate specifications of autonomic systems against
correctness properties. Although proven to be efficient with
handling consistency errors, this mechanism cannot handle
logical errors. Another submission to this workshop [26]
proposes a different model checking approach for ASSL, based
on Labelled Transition systems and LTL properties.
For linear-time logics, error diagnosis information is con-
ceptually of a simple type: It is given by a (possibly cyclic)
execution path of the system that violates the given property.
Thus, in case model-checking fails, linear-time model checkers
like SPIN [9] compute an output in form of an error trace
that represents a violating run, and is therefore valuable for
the subsequent diagnosis and repair. The situation is more
complex for properties that embody recovery issues. These
claim for more demanding properties expressible in branching-
time logics like CTL or the modal 휇-calculus. Such logics
do not just specify properties of single program executions
but properties of the entire execution tree, comprising the
local of decision points. Hence, meaningful error diagnosis
information for branching-time logic model checking cannot
be represented by linear executions in general. This is where
games help.
ESA’s FORMID Project (FOrmal Robotic Mission Inspec-
tion and Debugging) aimed at creating a development environ-
ment for the verification and analysis of robotic missions [4].
Unfortunately the system is solely concerned with predefined
property patterns for safety, liveness, and conflict-freedom of
the system. Therefore it is unable to handle more demanding
properties as they typically arise during system modelling
of complex systems that deal with self-healing and recovery
issues.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how to translate parts of an
ASSL specification for autonomic systems into a behavioral
model. This task implied to map the ASSL specific self-
management policy, action, and event parts that made up the
system to corresponding counterparts in a behavioral system
model that is based on a Kripke-Transition-Structure.
We applied this translation step to the NASA Voyager
II mission case study. This case study constitutes a picture
transmission process that sends picture pixels taken by the
Voyager spacecraft to four antennas on earth. These antennas
in turn forward transmitted picture pixels to Voyager’s mission
base where the complete image will be reconstructed.
The translation step opened up several options for verifying
issues related to e.g. recovery issues. After having detected
the absence of a recovery mechanism upon transmission error
within the system specification we may leverage the game-
based verification Model Checker GEAR to fix this problem.
A game-based exploration of the problem space as already
suggested a tool supported enhancement of the model-driven
verification process [15] can help in identifying those parts of
the model that need adaptation to overcome this specific prob-
lem. However, we did not elaborate on this exploration here
since the translation of the specification is still incomplete.
We have previous experience of automatic generation of
control flow graphs from a language’s Structured Operational
Semantics [17] (SOS). In [5] we showed how to do it for a
process algebra, later extended for object oriented languages.
Accordingly, we plan to examine the SOS for ASSL provided
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in [23] and possibly take it as a starting point for an SOS-
driven generation of the SLGs. This way, the palette of
model analyses developed in the jABC and the self-healing
specific techniques developed in SHADOWS would become
immediately applicable to all ASSL descriptions.
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